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Abstract
In this work, we develop efficient disruptions of black-box image translation
deepfake generation systems. We are the first to demonstrate black-box deep-
fake generation disruption by presenting image translation formulations of attacks
initially proposed for classification models. Nevertheless, a naive adaptation of
classification black-box attacks results in a prohibitive number of queries for image
translation systems in the real-world. We present a frustratingly simple yet highly
effective algorithm Leaking Universal Perturbations (LUP), that significantly re-
duces the number of queries needed to attack an image. LUP consists of two phases:
(1) a short leaking phase where we attack the network using traditional black-box
attacks and gather information on successful attacks on a small dataset and (2)
and an exploitation phase where we leverage said information to subsequently
attack the network with improved efficiency. Our attack reduces the total number
of queries necessary to attack GANimation and StarGAN by 30%.
1 Introduction
The popular term “deepfake” originally referred to the deep learning technique of transforming the
face of a person to reflect a different identity. Original techniques used a shared encoder and distinct
decoders for separate identities [11]. Contemporaneous methods using more elaborate combinations
of deep learning with computer graphics techniques achieved impressive results [16, 36, 37, 39].
Since then the term “deepfake” has been adopted in a broader context and can be used to refer to
any altered media of someone’s likeness. Recently there have been remarkable advances in face
modification algorithms. Some algorithms only need a single image and can create modified versions
of that person under different poses, expressions, lighting and other attribute changes [5, 30, 6]. The
most advanced algorithms can create puppeteering videos using as few as one image [44, 35]. This
few-shot deepfake technology based on image translation networks has gained popularity in the
mainstream with apps such as FaceApp 1 that allow for transformation of images such as putting a
smile on someone’s face and making them appear older or younger, among other interventions.
1https://www.faceapp.com
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These technologies can be used in malicious ways to produce undesirable content of someone
without their consent. This concern has already materialized in several ways, including creating
non-consensual pornographic footage and producing videos with fake political speeches.
Attempts to detect manipulated media are underway and there is an “arms race” between detecting
deepfakes [31, 43, 19, 40, 41] and evasion of deepfake detection [26, 9]. Instead of detecting
deepfakes after the fact, Ruiz et al. [32] recently proposed using white-box adversarial attacks to
protect an image from modification by image translation networks. While this work assumes that
the adversary has access to the model’s structure, weights and gradients, in a real scenario, these
might not be accessible. In this work, we focus on the black-box scenario where model parameters
are unknown.
An image translation-based online deepfake generation service usually allows for API queries where
a user sends an image and receives the translated output. This is an instance of the image translation
black-box threat model, where the structure, weights and gradients of the black-box are unknown,
but the output images are available to the adversary. In this work we demonstrate attacks on image
translation models under this threat model and show the vulnerability of several popular image
translation networks. Specifically, we are the first to explore black-box adversarial attacks on image
translation systems with an application of disrupting deepfake generation.
In our work, we reformulate black-box attacks for the image translation scenario and demonstrate
their effectiveness in preventing deepfake generation. However, the number of queries of such
black-box attacks might be prohibitive in a real-world scenario where an adversary might detect
an attempted attack or the query budget might run out. We present a simple, yet highly effective,
algorithm that we call Leaking Universal Perturbations (LUP) that sharply decreases the average
number of queries required to generate attacks. LUP is composed of two phases, a short leaking
phase during which the network is attacked using a traditional black-box attack on a small dataset of
images. And an exploitation phase, where the algorithm leverages the information obtained during
the leaking phase to subsequently attack the network with improved efficiency.
During the LUP leaking phase we attack a set of images using any black-box attack method. Once
these perturbations have been generated, PCA components are extracted from them. During the
exploitation phase we use a modified Simple Black-Box Attack (SimBA) [12] where the leaking
phase PCA components are used as attack vectors. If the image has not yet been successfully attacked,
and the loss saturates during the exploitation phase the algorithm reverts to the default image basis to
finish the attack. We are able to reduce the average number of necessary queries to attack an image
during the exploitation phase by around 30% compared to state-of-the-art methods such as SimBA
on multiple image translation networks.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We are the first to successfully attack black-box image translation systems, with an ap-
plication to disrupting generation of deepfake images. This is a first step in protecting
photographs of people from being modified by facial manipulation systems in the real world.
• We present a novel method called leaking universal perturbations (LUP), that vastly im-
proves the efficiency of black-box attacks by exploiting information gathered during initial
attacks performed in a leaking phase. This allows the attack to scale more efficiently
compared to other state-of-the-art methods.
2 Related Work
White-box Attacks on Classifiers Different threat models for adversarial attacks have been defined
for the image classification scenario. They are defined by the amount of information that the adversary
has regarding the target model. Under a white-box threat model in the classification scenario, the
structure and weights of the classifier h are available to the adversary. This means that the classifier
can be run locally on the adversaries’ infrastructure, and gradients can be computed. Under this
threat model Szegedy et al. [33] demonstrated the existence of adversarial examples for deep neural
network classifiers. Since then, there has been a large amount of work on attacking models under this
setting by performing gradient descent on the defined classification loss l or optimization methods
using the gradient information [33, 10, 24, 29, 2, 27, 23, 18, 22].
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Black-box Attacks on Classifiers In a real-world scenario the adversary might not have access
to either the structure or the weights of the classifier h. Instead, she might have access to an API
which allows queries to the model. The adversary might then have either access to the probability
outputs, or uniquely to the classification decisions of the model. The goal is to attack the model while
minimizing the number of queries as well as the magnitude of the attack under a suitable norm.
There is extensive work on black-box attacks on classification deep networks. One approach is to
train a surrogate network and transfer white-box attacks generated using the surrogate network to
the target network [28, 20]. Another effective approach is to estimate the gradients using finite-
differences, Monte Carlo sampling methods or other techniques and subsequently perform gradient
descent [3, 13, 14, 4, 38]. Another class of approaches are local-search approaches that attack the
network by probing the black-box without any gradient estimation [25, 12]. In contrast to these
methods, our LUP attack learns to perform a more efficient attack by collecting information on
initial black-box attacks. In essence, LUP learns transferable attack components that can be used to
efficiently query the model in a local-search manner in subsequent attacks.
Image Translation Adversarial Attacks Image translation networks have recently achieved im-
pressive results in deepfake generation and face modification using few images (or one image) of an
individual [5, 30, 6, 44, 35]. Some models allow for generation of video of a person saying things
that they did not say, using a single image [44, 35]. In general, most image translation models are
trained using a GAN setup. Some are trained in a supervised manner [15, 42, 44], while others are
trained in an unsupervised manner [45, 30, 5, 6].
There is previous work that demonstrates attacks on generative models and more specifically au-
toencoders [34, 17]. There is also work that explores self-adversarial attacks during training of
unsupervised GAN-based image translation networks [7, 1]. Recently, there has been work that
proposes adversarial attacks on image translation networks with the goal of disrupting the output [32].
Disrupting generation of deepfakes images reveals itself to be an interesting application for these
types of attacks. Ruiz et al. [32] explore white-box attacks on image translation networks such as
pix2pixHD [42] and CycleGAN [45]. They also show that their white-box attack allows for disruption
of deepfake generation using StarGAN [5] and GANimation [30]. Ruiz et al. [32] explore white-box
attacks on image translation models to disrupt deepfake generation, in contrast we explore black-box
attacks.
3 Method
We first provide formulations for image translation attacks (Sec. 3.1). We then present our formula-
tions of black-box attacks for image translation (Sec. 3.2). We then propose our method of leaking
universal perturbations (LUP), that obtains more efficient attacks than competing methods (Sec. 3.3).
3.1 Background
An adversarial example is an image with small additive changes, that can be imperceptible to a human
being, and affect the output label of the image classification model. In general an adversarial attack,
which creates adversarial examples, on an image classification model h is defined by:
min
η
ly(h(x+ η)), subject to p(η) ≤ . (1)
Different distance norms p have been proposed, and attacks usually use the L2 or L∞ norms. ly is a
surrogate loss that measures the degree of certainty that the model will classify the input as class y.
This surrogate loss can be defined in different ways, depending on the output of the model.
To delve into black-box attacks on image translation models, it is helpful to first present formulations
for the white-box scenario. Ruiz et al. [32] formulate a targeted attack on an image translation
generatorG, with target r:
min
η
L(G(x+ η), r), subject to p(η) ≤ , (2)
where x is the input image, η is the generated perturbation, p is a chosen norm,  is the maximum
attack magnitude and L is the chosen image-level regression loss.
3
They also define an untargeted attack seeking to maximize the distortion of the output image with
respect to the ground-truth non-attacked output. We call this a maximum distortion attack.
max
η
L(G(x+ η),G(x)), subject to p(η) ≤ . (3)
3.2 Black-Box Attacks on Image Translation Models
In this section we propose formulations of image translation formulations of black-box attacks initially
proposed for image classification. We reformulate two gradient estimation-based approaches, Natural
Evolution Strategies [13] and Bandits-TD [14] and a local search-based attack SimBA [12]. We do
so by replacing the typical classification loss l by an image-level regression loss L, that measures the
distance between the target image r and the translated adversarial exampleG(x+ η).
Gradient Estimation-based Attacks Under a black-box threat model, the weights and structure
of the model are unknown. Thus, attacking the model using gradient-descent is not directly feasible.
A solution explored in the literature on attacks on classifiers is to estimate the gradient∇l(x) of the
classification loss l around point x by using Monte Carlo sampling methods.
We reformulate both the Natural Evolution Strategies (NES) [13] and Bandits-TD [14] attacks for the
image translation scenario. We show that they are able to produce effective attacks on popular image
translation networks and are able to disrupt deepfake generation.
Our formulation of image translation NES (IT-NES) gradient estimate for the image-level regression
loss L using generatorG, with n queries is:
∇E[L(G(x), r)] ≈ 1
σn
n∑
i=1
δiL(G(x+ σδi), r), (4)
where r is the target image, σ is the variance of the Gaussian search distribution and using antithetic
sampling we have δi ∼ N (0, I) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n2 } and set δj = −δn−j+1 for j ∈ {(n2 + 1), . . . , n}.
The adversarial example is then updated using the estimated gradient
xt+1 = xt − ∇E[L(G(x), r)]. (5)
Bandits-TD introduces both a time dependent prior capturing the correlation of gradients across time
steps and a data dependent prior capturing the spatial correlation of gradients in an image. Bandits-TD
uses the antithetic NES gradient estimation method with n = 2.
We reformulate the Bandits-TD black-box attack for image translation in similar fashion to IT-NES.
We call this formulation image translation Bandits-TD (IT-Bandits-TD). We replace the classification
criterion ly(x) for image x and label y by the image-level regression criterion Lr = L(x, r), where
r is the target image. We perform gradient descent for our targeted attack.
Local Search-based Attack We reformulate the Simple Black-box Attack (SimBA) proposed in
[12] for the image translation scenario. First, SimBA generates an orthonormal image basis of vectors
q ∈ Γ, and Γ is the set of orthonormal candidate vectors. A natural basis is composed of images with
0 everywhere except at (i, j) for all i ∈ {1, ..., d} and j ∈ {1, ..., d}, where d is the image size.
In the classification scenario, with a classifier h and a classification loss ly(h(x)), SimBA iterates
over all candidate vectors q ∈ Γ. At time step t, SimBA determines whether x+ q increases the loss.
If yes, the candidate vector is added to the adversarial example, if not then the opposite direction is
sampled x− q to the same effect. If both directions do not increase the loss then the candidate vector
is skipped. The algorithm halts whenever the classifier incorrectly classifies the perturbed image
h(x˜) 6= y. Again, we reformulate SimBA for image translation by replacing the classification loss ly
by the regression loss Lr, and call this method image translation SimBA (IT-SimBA).
3.3 Leaking Universal Perturbations (LUP)
In the black-box adversarial attack setting, we are given a budget of black-box queries for each image
we would like to attack. In this setting, we have the same number of maximum allowed queries for
all images in the dataset. That is, for each image x we want to solve the optimization problem
min
η
L(G(x+ η), r), subject to p(η) ≤ ,Q ≤ B, (6)
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whereG is the generator of the image translation system, η is the perturbation,Q is the number of
queries used andB is the maximum number of queries allowed for a single image.
An adversary would benefit from reducing the total number of queries required to attack a given
dataset B0. Our proposed algorithm seeks to reduce B0 by, first, leaking elements of a universal
perturbation from a small auxiliary dataset and then exploiting these transferable components on the
images in the larger test dataset. It has two phases (1) the leaking phase, where we attack the model
using a traditional attack and gather information on successful attacks on a small auxiliary dataset (2)
the exploitation phase where we attack the model using the leaked information from the first phase
on the larger test set. This allows us to sharply reduce the number of amortized queries needed.
Algorithm 1: LUP Exploitation Phase
Input: image x, generator G, leaked PCA
components Q, image basis Γ, threshold τ ,
max. queriesB, step size ξ, max. saturating
loss iterations nsat, target image r
Output: perturbation η
η = 0; Q = 0; i = 0;
phase two = False;
l = L(G(x), r);
while l < τ andQ ≤ B do
if phase two then
pick q ∈ Γ randomly w/o replacement;
else
pick q ∈ Q in order;
end
for α ∈ {ξ,−ξ} do
l′ = L(G(x+ η + αq), r);
Q = Q+ 1;
if l′ < l then
η = η + αq;
l = l′;
i = 0;
break;
else
i = i+ 1
end
end
if i ≥ nsat − 1 then
phase two = True;
end
end
return η
Algorithm 2: LUP Leaking Phase
Input: leaking dataset Ds, generator G, image
basis Γ, threshold τ , max. queriesB,
step size ξ, target image r
Output: set of leaked PCA components Q
H = {};
for x ∈ D do
η = IT-SimBA(x,G,Γ, τ,B, ξ, r);
H = H ∪ {η};
end
run PCA on H and obtain components Q;
return Q
Algorithm 3: IT-SimBA: SimBA [12] using an
image-level regression loss L for attacking image
translation models
Input: image x, generator G, image basis Γ,
threshold τ , max. queriesB, step size ξ,
target image r
Output: perturbation η
η = 0; Q = 0; i = 0;
l = L(G(x), r);
while l < τ andQ ≤ B do
pick q ∈ Γ randomly w/o replacement;
for α ∈ {ξ,−ξ} do
l′ = L(G(x+ η + αq), r);
Q = Q+ 1;
if l′ < l then
η = η + αq;
l = l′;
break;
end
end
end
return η
Algorithm Our algorithm has two phases, the leaking phase and the exploitation phase. During the
leaking phase, it performs a traditional black-box attack on a separate dataset Ds consisting of Ns
images, drawn from the same distribution as our test dataset D. We extract principal components
from these perturbations using principal component analysis (PCA). During the exploitation phase
we use the principal components to improve the efficiency of our black-box attacks on the test dataset
D. We accomplish this by querying the black-box using the leaked principal components using a
modified IT-SimBA. We achieve strong attacks using fewer queries. We now describe the two phases
in detail, and provide pseudocode in Algorithms 1, 2.
Leaking Phase During the leaking phase we apply a black-box attack on a leaking dataset Ds. We
attack all images x ∈ Ds until we achieve successful attacks (L(G(x+ η), r) < τ , where τ is the
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Table 1: Attack comparison on GANimation with threshold τ = 0.005 using 3 expressions (left) and
on StarGAN for threshold τ = 0.05 using 5 attributes (right). We show the mean number of queries
per image, as well as the average norm of the perturbation and the success rate percentage.
GANimation
Attack Avg. Queries Avg. Norm Success Rate
IT-NES 598 1.82 98.8%
IT-Bandits-TD 855 4.38 96.3%
IT-SimBA 551 4.87 97.9%
LUP 393 3.07 98.6%
StarGAN
Attack Avg. Queries Avg. Norm Success Rate
IT-NES 1,001 2.90 99.8%
IT-Bandits-TD 4,901 4.99 52.2%
IT-SimBA 444 5.93 100%
LUP 313 6.36 100%
Figure 1: Histogram of queries required for successful attacks on GANimation (3,000 attacks, three
expressions), using success threshold τ = 0.005. Vertical lines show mean queries for each method.
success threshold) or until we use a maximum number ofQ queries. We create a set P of generated
perturbations η. Our framework is general and any attack or combination of attacks can be used for
the leaking phase. We use PCA on perturbations η ∈ P and extract principal components q ∈ Q.
Exploitation Phase Our exploitation phase consists of using a modified IT-SimBA using q ∈ Q
as candidate vectors. Since Q is not necessarily a basis of the image space (because Ns < d2), and
even though the initial iterations of the attack very rapidly decrease the loss, the attack might saturate.
We switch to a full basis in image space Γ after a number of iterations nsat of saturating loss. The
resulting attacks achieve strong results using substantially fewer queriesQ.
4 Experiments
In this section we first introduce the datasets and architectures used to demonstrate the efficacy
of our LUP method (Sec. 4.1). When then introduce our experimental setup and implementation
details. Next, we present results on two image translation-based deepfake generation architectures
GANimation [30] and StarGAN [5]. We use IT-SimBA for the leaking phase in all experiments.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Architectures and Datasets We attack the GANimation [30] and StarGAN [5] architectures. For
GANimation we attack three expressions coded with distinct facial action units (AUs) and present
average results. The expressions correspond to smile with closed eyes, smile with open eyes and
eyebrow raise with smile. These classes were selected because they enact very salient changes in
the image, as opposed to other more subtle expressions. For StarGAN we present average results
over 5 different attribute classes. The classes are black hair, blond hair, brown hair, female and old.
The dataset used for both architectures is the CelebA dataset [21]. For GANimation we attack 1,000
images using each expression, yielding 3,000 individual attacks. For StarGAN we attack 200 images
using 5 different classes, yielding 1,000 individual attacks.
Implementation Details We use an adapted version of the NES and Bandits-TD implementations
from the official Bandits-TD codebase. We modify the SimBA implementation from the official
SimBA codebase. For NES and Bandits-TD we follow the parameter settings in the corresponding
papers. For SimBA we use the same parameters used in the SimBA paper, except for the step size
where we use 0.4 instead of 0.2. We use the same step size for LUP. We use a maximum number of
saturating loss steps nsat = 20 for LUP.
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Figure 2: Success rate by number of queries on 3,000 attacks on GANimation for three expressions
(left) and 1,000 attacks on StarGAN for five attribute classes (right). We use success thresholds
τ = 0.005 and τ = 0.05 respectively. Vertical lines represent mean queries for each method.
Figure 3: Histogram of queries required for a successful attack on StarGAN of 1,000 attacks (five
classes). We use a success threshold τ = 0.05. Vertical lines represent mean queries for each method.
For the GANimation architecture, we build our leaked PCA components using 100 images, for each
of the three expressions evaluated. We attack them using SimBA until we achieve the 0.005 success
threshold or until we have performed 1,000 iterations of SimBA. We perform a total of 83,952 queries
to construct these components (on average 27,984 queries for each expression). For StarGAN we
build our PCA components using 10 images and 5 classes. We attack these images using SimBA
until we achieve the 0.05 success threshold or until we have performed 1,000 iterations of SimBA. In
total we perform 16,147 queries to build this basis.
4.2 Experimental Results
In this section we attack GANimation and StarGAN using IT-NES, IT-Bandits-TD, IT-SimBA
and LUP. We compare the average number of queries required to successfully attack an image
(by obtaining a loss under the designated threshold). We also present success rates and average
perturbation magnitudes.
GANimation We attack GANimation using an identity attack, where we select the target image
r to be the input image, such that using our attack we push the network output to be the same
as the input. We select a success threshold of τ = 0.005, meaning that we halt the attack when
L(G(x+ η),x) ≤ τ . After a successful attack at this threshold the transformations by GANimation
are not noticeable. We use a maximum number of queriesB = 10, 000 for all methods. In Table 1
we show comparisons between LUP, IT-NES, IT-Bandits-TD and IT-SimBA. We can see that LUP
is much more efficient than other methods achieving a ~30% reduction in average queries (551 vs.
393) compared to the next best method (IT-SimBA). Our method also achieves a lower average
perturbation norm than the comparable IT-SimBA attack as well as an improved success rate. We
present results for other thresholds in the supplementary material.
In Figure 1 we present histograms of the number of queries needed to successfully attack images
in the dataset. We can see that LUP is heavily skewed to the left and we achieve successful attacks
using fewer than 20 queries for around half of the images in the dataset. This confirms our intuition
that for certain architectures, the information collected during the leaking phase allows us to build
transferable attacks that resemble universal perturbations and that by exploiting this information we
can construct effective attacks using very few queries for a large population of images. Figure 2 shows
the cumulative histogram of images successfully attacked for the number of queries represented by
the x-axis. We observe that LUP achieves superior results than the competing methods.
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Figure 4: Qualitative examples of our LUP attack on StarGAN [5] and GANimation [30]. We choose
a maximum distortion attack for StarGAN, where we successfully distort the output of the network
and make it unusable. We chose an identity attack for GANimation, where we successfully push the
output of the network to be the same as the identity. Both approaches thwart deepfake generation.
StarGAN We attack 200 images on the StarGAN architecture using 5 different attribute classes.
We use a maximum distortion attack (called optimal attack in [32]), where the target image r is the
non-attacked output imageG(x) and we maximize the loss instead of minimizing it to achieve the
maximum amount of distortion in the output image. We present results for a threshold τ = 0.05,
where the output image is visibly distorted. We use a maximum number of queries B = 10, 000
for all methods. In Table 1 we show comparisons between IT-NES, IT-Bandits-TD, IT-SimBA and
the exploitation phase of LUP. We can see that LUP is much more efficient than other methods
achieving a reduction in mean queries of ~30% compared to the next best attack and achieving a
100% success rate. In this case the average norm is higher than competing methods. Qualitative
analysis of images shows that the attack remains imperceptible (Figure 4). Additional qualitative
examples and experiments with different thresholds are included in supplementary material.
In Figure 3 we show histograms of the number of queries required to attack images in the dataset. We
can see that again LUP is heavily skewed to the left compared to competing methods. Figure 2 shows
the cumulative histogram of images successfully attacked for a specific number of queries.
One remark is that Bandits-TD, a method that achieves very good results in the image classification
scenario on multiple networks, does not perform very well in this scenario. We believe that this is
due to the time dependent prior. We observe that StarGAN presents strong random-seeming changes
in the image output when a white-box attack of varying magnitude is applied. This seems to indicate
that the gradient steps across time steps are not very correlated. We see the loss for Bandits-TD
oscillate instead of strictly increase, which would seem to confirm our hypothesis.
Discussion The results demonstrate that LUP is more efficient than IT-SimBA during the exploita-
tion phase. This is a consequence of the transferability of the leaked PCA components that are
subsequently used as candidate vectors during the exploitation phase. We find that image translation
architectures have specific vulnerabilities and that there exist correlations between attacks constructed
for different images. This is the nugget of intuition that motivates our proposed approach.
By extrapolation, we estimate that the total amount of queries to attack 100,000 images for the
GANimation architecture using the LUP algorithm is 39,383,952 - counting both the leaking and
exploitation phases. Using IT-SimBA the total amount of queries would be 55,100,000 - roughly
15.7 million more queries. When scaling to a real service, which protects images of individuals
from deepfake generation, that service will be expected to protect millions of images. We conclude
that this reduction in the total number of black-box queries can save significant resources.
5 Conclusion
In this work we present the first successful black-box attacks on image translation systems, with an
application to disrupting the generation of deepfake images. This is a step forward in the war on
deepfakes, since many modern deepfake generation systems can manipulate a face using only one
image and no longer need to rely on face swapping or large datasets of images of a person. Our work
can be directly used to protect photographs of people from being modified by deep learning facial
manipulation systems in the real world by attacking these systems.
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A key limitation of many existing black-box attacks on classifiers, that we modify for applicability to
the image translation scenario, is the high number of queries needed to generate adversarial attacks.
We present a simple, yet highly effective method, called Leaking Universal Perturbations (LUP), that
reduces the total number of queries necessary to find attacks for a dataset of images by extracting
information from initial attacks during a leaking phase. This information is then used during an
exploitation phase to achieve more efficient attacks. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method
on both the GANimation and StarGAN architectures on the CelebA dataset.
Broader Impact
Deepfake generation technology has been advancing at an ever accelerating pace and has already
achieved impressive results. There are several compelling potential applications of the technology,
such as face frontalization, actor editing in movies, correcting expressions, pose or lighting in
pictures, and realistic avatar generation. We believe that many of these applications are either neutral
or good for society as a whole. Unfortunately, deepfakes have several potential applications that are
incontestably negative and morally wrong. In this work we have discussed some of these applications,
that have already materialized, such as non-consensual pornographic footage generation and fake
political speeches.
We firmly believe that a person has an inalienable right to protect their likeness. Our work is a first
step in this direction. The ultimate goal of our work is to enable a person to have the choice of
giving or withholding consent when it comes to deepfake generation of their likeness. With advances
in black-box attacks on generative models, we believe there is a chance of achieving this goal. If
a security arms race were to begin in this area, we believe that the mere existence of protection
mechanisms for people’s images will increase the cost of generating non-consensual deepfakes.
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Supplementary Material
Experiments With Varying Thresholds
In this section we present comparisons of attacks on StarGAN and GANimation with different
thresholds. In the main manuscript we presented results for GANimation under the threshold
τ = 0.005. We now present results for threshold τ = 0.01 in Table 2. Similarly, the main manuscript
presented results for StarGAN under the threshold τ = 0.005. Table 3 show results for StarGAN
under the threshold τ = 0.025 for a maximum distortion attack. We observe that LUP achieves
successful attacks using substantially lower number of average queries compared to IT-NES, IT-
Bandits-TD and IT-SimBA.
We also show the corresponding histograms of successful attacks for LUP, IT-SimBA and IT-NES for
GANimation in Figure 5 (τ = 0.01) and StarGAN in Figure 6 (τ = 0.025). For both networks we
observe distributions for LUP that are very skewed to the left, compared to IT-SimBA and IT-NES. In
particular LUP is able to successfully complete more than 2,500 out of 3,000 attacks using 20 or less
queries for GANimation using threshold τ = 0.01 (Figure 5).
Figure 7 shows the success rate curves for GANimation and StarGAN under the thresholds τ = 0.01,
and τ = 0.025, respectively. We retrieve the same result patterns as the main manuscript, with LUP
performing best among competing algorithms.
Additional Qualitative Samples
We show samples of attacked images for StarGAN using LUP in Figure 8. We present the original
image, the attacked input images and the disrupted output images for different samples and for all
five classes used in the main manuscript (black hair, blond hair, brown hair, female and old). We
observe that all of the translated images have been disrupted and can no longer be used for their
original purpose.
We show samples of attacked images for GANimation using LUP in Figure 9. We use an identity
attack, where we push the output of the attacked image to be the same as the input image (i.e. we
disable modification by GANimation). We test on three different expressions, corresponding to
eyebrow raise with smile, smile with closed eyes and smile with open eyes. We observe that all of
the attacked outputs are very similar to the input and there are no perceptible modifications by the
GANimation network. We can also observe that the attacks on the inputs are imperceptible and thus
do not lower the quality of the input image.
Details on GANimation and StarGAN
GANimation We use an open-source implementation of GANimation trained for 37 epochs on the
CelebA [21] dataset for 17 action units (AU) from the Facial Action Unit Coding System (FACS) [8].
GANimation takes as input a vector of facial Action Units (AUs). For the entirety of our work we
selected three sufficiently distinct AU vectors, each describing a different expression. The three AU
vectors that we selected correspond to: eyebrow raise with smile, smile with closed eyes, smile with
open eyes.
StarGAN We use the official open-source implementation of StarGAN, trained on the CelebA
dataset [21] for the five attributes black hair, blond hair, brown hair, female and old. We use these
same attribute classes for our attacks.
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Table 2: Attack comparison of identity attack on GANimation with threshold τ = 0.01 using 3
expressions. We show the mean number of queries per image, as well as the average norm of the
perturbation and the success rate percentage.
Attack Avg. Queries Avg. Norm Success Rate
IT-NES 226 1.05 100%
IT-Bandits-TD 254 3.20 99.8%
IT-SimBA 186 2.97 100%
LUP 83 1.49 100%
Table 3: Attack comparison of maximum distortion attacks on StarGAN for threshold τ = 0.025
using 5 attributes. We show the mean number of queries per image, as well as the average norm of
the perturbation and the success rate percentage.
Attack Avg. Queries Avg. Norm Success Rate
IT-NES 633 2.32 100%
IT-Bandits-TD 3229 5.00 86.8%
IT-SimBA 232 4.41 100%
LUP 143 4.26 100%
Figure 5: Histogram of queries required for successful attacks on GANimation (3,000 attacks, three
expressions), using success threshold τ = 0.01. Vertical lines show mean queries for each method.
Figure 6: Histogram of queries required for a successful attack on StarGAN of 1,000 attacks (five
classes). We use a success threshold τ = 0.025. Vertical lines represent mean queries for each
method.
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Figure 7: Success rate by number of queries on 3,000 attacks on GANimation for three expressions
(left) and 1,000 attacks on StarGAN for five attribute classes (right). We use success threshold
τ = 0.01 for GANimation and threshold τ = 0.025 for StarGAN. Vertical lines represent mean
queries for each method.
Figure 8: Qualitative examples of our LUP attack on StarGAN [5]. Using a maximum distortion
attack where we successfully distort the output of the network and make it unusable. We show results
for five different attribute classes black hair, blond hair, brown hair, female and old, in this order. We
first show the unaltered, original input image in the first column. Then, for each attribute we show
(1) the attacked input image (2) the output of StarGAN using the attacked input, for this attribute
modification. We show these successively for each attribute.
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Figure 9: Qualitative examples of our LUP attack on GANimation [30]. Using an identity attack
where we successfully push the output of the network to be the same as the identity. We show the
attack for three different expressions. Eyebrow raise with smile (left), smile with open eyes (middle)
and smile with closed eyes (right). For each expression column we show (1) the original input image
(2) the ground-truth, non-attacked output of GANimation (3) the attacked input (4) the output of
GANimation using the attacked input.
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